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 [T]he light of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and 
purged from ambiguity;  reason is the  pace ; increase of  science , the  way ; and the benefit of man-
kind, the  end . And on the contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like 
 ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them is wandering among innumerable absurdities; and their 
end, contention, and sedition, or contempt. 
 – Thomas Hobbes 1 
 How language works – its functions, mechanisms, and limitations – matters to the 
early moderns as much as it does to contemporary philosophers. Many of the moderns 
make refl ection on language central to their philosophical projects, both as a tool for 
explaining human cognition, and as a weapon to be used against competing views. Even 
in philosophers for whom language is less central, we can fi nd important connections 
between their views on language and their other philosophical commitments. 
 This is not to say that language matters to the moderns for the same reasons it mat-
ters to us. In what follows, I begin by asking why reflection on language occupies the 
privileged place it does in so many of their works. In the second section, I consider the 
possibility of language in nonhuman animals, partly to discover just what the moderns 
think counts as a language. If we can find out why some philosophers think that animals 
that clearly produce articulate sounds in response to their environments nevertheless 
fall short of being language users, we shall have a good idea of just what these think-
ers take language to be. Here I shall say something briefly about what some moderns 
thought language could  become : a perfect instrument for the communication and dis-
covery of truths. 
 In the third and fourth sections, I explore how these philosophers think human 
languages actually work. The modern period is what Ian Hacking calls “the heyday 
of ideas”: most philosophers defend a broadly mentalistic picture, according to which 
words have meaning only to the extent that they are associated with mental objects or 
events. Language as such contributes nothing to thought and inherits whatever mean-
ing it has from thought. I shall argue that, on the whole, the philosophers of the period 
do not believe that words refer at all, whether to things or ideas; neither do words have 




 Quine calls the claim that words get their meaning by being associated with private 
mental contents “the museum myth” (1969, 27). Frege and Wittgenstein, each in his 
own way, critique this general picture on the grounds that it makes meaning publicly 
inaccessible. But objections to the dominant view on the basis of the privacy of the 
mental are hardly news; Locke’s indefatigable critic, John Sergeant, attacked him on 
these same lines. As we shall see, the moderns are not without their defenses. 
 With this as background, we can then (in section 5) trace out the consequences of 
the moderns’ views on language. Thus, I proceed to the question of definitions, so cen-
tral to the Scholastic conception of  scientia . I shall argue that in some cases the moderns’ 
understanding of how language functions reins in the aspiration to real definitions. It is 
here that we shall see distinctive conceptions of the signification of words put to work 
in attacking Scholastic views. And we shall also find defenders of real definitions, such 
as Leibniz and Sergeant, fighting back. 
 In section 6, we turn to the problem of universals. Even the most rabid nominalist 
must account for one obvious linguistic phenomenon: the applicability of a single name 
to multiple individuals. 2 More turns on this question than might at first appear. For 
the Scholastics, the mind’s ability to use universals in thought – in Aquinas’s jargon, 
to abstract the intelligible species from its material conditions – is indicative of the 
intellect’s immateriality. 3 Thus it is particularly important for a materialist like Hobbes, 
and for anyone who, like Locke, wishes to remain agnostic about the materiality of the 
mind, 4 to offer another explanation. 5 
 Having dealt with the signification of individual words, we can turn to propositions 
(section 7). The issue is interesting in its own right, because the moderns confront 
recognizably contemporary problems, such as the unity of the proposition. But it also 
has implications for the further development of empiricism in particular. By making 
room for syncategorematic terms – terms such as ‘is,’ ‘if,’ and ‘but’ – some philosophers 
believe we can sensefully talk about that which lies beyond all experience. At the end 
of this chapter (section 8), I hope to indicate how otherwise obscure questions about the 
nature of the proposition lie at the heart of some core issues in early modern philosophy 
generally. 
 1. Why does language matter to the moderns? 6 
 In the early modern period, refl ection on language is undertaken not so much as a 
worthy endeavor in its own right but as a means of diagnosing the errors of one’s com-
petitors. What spurs most of these fi gures is not disinterested curiosity but a need to 
wrest control of the intellectual climate from the schools. Thus, the most obvious way 
in which language matters to the moderns is as a danger and, correspondingly, as a pos-
sible means of cognitive “therapy.” Having recognized a family of errors as fl owing from 
some mistaken assumption about how words work, one is then cured of the desire, say, 
to suppose that each thing is possessed of its own nature or essence, or that each quality 
for which we have a word must correspond to some real quality in the object. 
 Some of the dangers on which the moderns fixate are thoroughly pedestrian. The 
constant injunctions one finds to avoid ambiguity and metaphor in philosophical or 
scientific contexts are hardly new. Nor is it particularly hard to see why such injunc-
tions should be so common. As the Aristotelian view 7 crumbles, so many competitors 
arise that even the simplest words no longer have an agreed upon meaning. In 1629, 
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Descartes writes, “[a]s it is, almost all our words have confused meanings, and men’s 
minds are so accustomed to them that there is hardly anything which they can perfectly 
understand.” 8 When there is no universally accepted worldview to take the place of the 
old, even a word like ‘weight,’ let alone ‘gravity,’ takes on different meanings, depending 
on which of the available theories the speaker happens to hold. 9 
 Replacing the Aristotelian view means uprooting common ways of speaking. Bacon, 
for example, says that unless “men are forewarned and arm themselves against them,” 
the idols or illusions 10 enshrined in the old philosophy will infect the new. 11 At a deeper 
level, then, we find the worry that a major barrier to the acceptance of the new phi-
losophies is ordinary language itself. Both Aristotelianism and ordinary speech are shot 
through with ontological assumptions many of the new philosophers wish to brand as 
false. Indeed, despite their technical sophistication (or, as most moderns prefer, their 
predilection for “insignificant speech”), 12 the Scholastics are seen as simply codifying 
the errors embedded in ordinary language. 
 Consider the doctrine of secondary qualities. Galileo, Descartes, Locke, and others 
agree that qualities such as color and taste are either bare powers or nothing at all in the 
bodies themselves. There are no real, nondispositional feature of bodies that we report 
with words like ‘fuchsia’ or ‘tangy.’ How were the Scholastics led to think otherwise? 
Partly, the moderns think, because they took ordinary language as a good guide to meta-
physics. When we have meaningful words for a quality, we are tempted to think that 
they must correspond to a genuine quality in the objects of which we predicate them. 13 
 This is no mere misstep on the part of the Scholastics but an instance of a pervasive 
tendency, common to the schoolmen and to the rest of us, to fall under the spell of lan-
guage. In his  Treatise on the Emendation of the Understanding , Spinoza writes that “words, no 
less than imagination, can bring about many grave errors unless we exercise great caution.” 
For Spinoza, words are “a part of the imagination,” and, having been instituted by human 
beings according to the imagination and not the intellect, must be used with care. 14 
 In giving a diagnosis of the tendency to take ordinary language as our guide to meta-
physics, the moderns typically point to the danger of focusing on words rather than 
things. To put it somewhat hyperbolically, their worry is that words will usurp the place 
that ideas should properly play in thought. 15 “Words,” Hobbes writes, “are wise men’s 
counters; they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools.” 16 As Arnauld 
and Nicole put it in their  Logic : 
 [O]ur need to use external signs to make ourselves understood causes us to 
connect our ideas to words in such a way that we often pay more attention to 
the words than to the things. Now this is one of the most common causes of 
confusion in our thoughts and discourse. 17 
 But why were the moderns so worried about this particular pitfall? One answer comes 
from their attitude toward Scholastic natural philosophy. In its simplest form, Aristo-
telian science is classifi catory. One begins with a set of defi nitions arrived at through 
experience. These  per se or essential predications are intended to capture the essence 
of the thing. 18 One then uses these defi nitions in syllogisms that are not just formally 
valid but that show why something  must be the case. To give a hackneyed example, the 
defi nition of man as a rational animal, plus the premise that Socrates is a man, allows us 
to infer that Socrates is rational. More than this, however, the syllogism is also supposed 
to  explain why Socrates is rational, namely by showing that he shares in the essence of 
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man. This admittedly simplifi ed example nevertheless captures the basic form a com-
pleted Aristotelian science would take: a set of demonstrations, based on real or  de re 
defi nitions, that allows us to explain why things happen as they do. 19 
 Although Aristotle and the Scholastics agree that empirical observation is essential 
for discovering real essences, the moderns worry that syllogistic logic depends too much 
on definitions generated not even from the armchair but from the classroom. One’s 
conclusions will be only as good as the definitions with which one starts. The general 
attitude is that the Scholastic program for science is a garbage in–garbage out system. 
 However useful syllogisms might be for stating one’s results, most of the figures I shall 
discuss agree that they are not a useful tool for discovery. 20 More than this, syllogisms 
cozen philosophers into thinking they are making genuine progress when all they are 
doing is manipulating elements in a formal system. This kind of worry is no doubt 
partly responsible for the low esteem in which formal approaches were generally held. In 
Locke’s  Essay , for example, we find an insistence on the mind’s capacity to detect errors 
in reasoning without the help of Scholastic textbooks and, more generally, without the 
aid of any kind of formal analysis. 21 Such hostile attitudes toward syllogistic logic are 
admirably expressed by Joseph Glanvill, a friend of Locke’s, who dismisses Scholastic 
natural philosophy as a “flatulent vacuity.” 22 
 But this is not to say that there were not philosophers pushing in the other direction. 
Arguing against Locke, Leibniz claims that the invention of the syllogism is “one of the 
finest, and indeed one of the most important, to be made by the human mind.” 23 Harking 
back to his own ambitions for a universal characteristic, a numerical system that would 
form the perfect language, Leibniz speaks of syllogistic logic as a kind of “universal math-
ematics.” 24 And Hobbes devotes part of his treatment of logic to syllogisms. As we shall 
see, these philosophers’ divergent attitudes toward the formalism of the Scholastics can 
be traced back to their own approaches to definition. If one begins with real definitions, 
definitions that capture the essence or, in Hobbes’s case, the causes of a thing, the products 
of one’s syllogistic reasoning might be correspondingly more valuable. The disagreement 
illustrates the complex relationship between the Scholastics and the moderns: even when 
they are dismissed, Scholastic ideas or methods percolate through modern texts. 25 
 2. Languages, animal and perfect 
 In his  Discourse on Method of 1637, Descartes argues that we have “two very certain 
means” of distinguishing beings that have souls from everything else, including nonhu-
man animals and machines. 26 Having explained the body and nearly all its motions and 
functions in purely mechanical terms, Descartes must now fi nd some way of distinguish-
ing ensouled beings from others. 27 The best evidence we can have for the presence of a 
soul is the presence of reason, the “universal instrument,” 28 and language. Though the 
operations of reason extend more widely, they include their most obvious manifesta-
tion, language. Descartes argues that only a human being is able to “produce different 
arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is 
said in its presence.” 29 
 Descartes later drops the reference to reason or subsumes it under the heading of 
language. In his 1646 letter to the Marquess of Newcastle, Descartes claims that 
 [i]n fact, there are none of our external actions that could assure those who 
examine them that our body is not simply a machine that moves itself, but 
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contains a soul that has thoughts, were it not for words or other signs made 
in reference to topics that present themselves without any relation to any 
passion. 30 
 Each of the qualifi cations Descartes makes here is important. First, to avoid begging the 
question, he allows that signs other than words can constitute a language. (Descartes 
does not want to deny that mutes can in a sense “speak.”) Second, it is vital that the 
signs produced not have “any relation to any passion” simply because signs so used can 
be explained purely mechanically. This excludes not only grunts and cries of pain but, 
Descartes thinks, any signs a being or machine can be taught to produce on command. 
When your parrot tells you that Wellington won at Waterloo, it does so only in response 
to some stimulus. By contrast, even a madman’s disjointed and irrational speech is gen-
erated spontaneously and not simply in response to external stimuli. 31 
 What lessons can we draw from these arguments? At a minimum, a language speaker 
must use signs to indicate to others her own mental states. But this is not sufficient. 
Language use requires the deployment of signs in such a way as to indicate thoughts 
that are not tied to the being’s immediate surroundings or passions. This is a very vague 
criterion, but Descartes’s general point seems clear. More controversially, Descartes’s 
talk of our ability to produce different “arrangements of signs” suggests a criterion of 
compositionality: one must be able to use the same signs, differently arranged, to indi-
cate different thoughts. 32 
 Given that the chief use of a language is to express our thoughts, what, under ideal 
conditions, would language look like? Having looked at one end of the spectrum – 
sounds and marks that do not rise to the level of language use – we can now pause to 
look at the other. The intense awareness of the arbitrary nature of words in the modern 
period made the prospect of a perfect language seem at once intensely desirable and, in 
some minds, achievable. Criticizing such a proposal passed on to him by his friend Mer-
senne, Descartes sketches how such a language would have to be developed, namely on 
analogy with mathematics. Given a limited number of primitives, one can understand 
any integer. So, order is what is needed; all possible thoughts would have to be arranged 
on analogy with the order of natural numbers. If such an order could be discovered, it 
would enable a recursive generation and comprehension of any possible thought. Such 
a perfect language depends on the true philosophy that would separate out all the simple 
ideas in the human imagination out of which all thoughts are made. 33 Descartes is 
pessimistic about the prospects for a perfect language: it would be tantamount to a “ter-
restrial paradise.” Leibniz, for his part, is more sanguine, and drew up plans for what he 
calls the “universal characteristic.” 34 For Descartes, mathematics is a model or analogy 
for the perfect language; for Leibniz, the perfect language just is mathematics, with the 
addition of a semantics that joins each number to an idea. Once in possession of such a 
language, we could settle any dispute simply by calculation. Leibniz seems never to have 
abandoned his hopes despite never making any real progress toward achieving them. 35 
 Neither of the ideal languages contemplated by Descartes or Leibniz would represent 
a return to the language of Adam, who (some thought) possessed a mystical language 
whose words expressed the true natures of things. Jacob Boehme is perhaps the most 
prominent figure of the era to hanker after an Adamic language and to accord it a quasi-
mystical status. Kabalistic thinkers of the era also exhibit similar tendencies. 36 Instead, 




 Nearly all parties to the debate accept that words are signs imposed purely arbitrarily. 
Leibniz might seem to be the exception, and in a sense, he is. In response to Locke’s 
assertion that words are arbitrarily chosen, Leibniz argues that, although our selections 
of sounds are not determined by any natural necessity, nevertheless, “they are settled 
by reasons – sometimes natural ones in which chance plays some part, sometimes moral 
ones which involve choice.” 37 (Leibniz devotes his single lengthiest response to Locke 
in all of the  New Essays to this issue.) Leibniz tries to establish two interconnected 
points: that all European languages have a “primitive root-origin” 38 and that this lan-
guage in some cases was formed in imitation of the sounds of nature. The latter point is 
designed to support the former. Thus, for example, Leibniz thinks that the Latin  coaxere 
and the German  couaqen or  quaken were derived from a common word intended to 
mimic the croaking of frogs. However prescient Leibniz’s hypothesis of an ur-language 
might be, it is far from the mystical view of Boehme: there is no suggestion that this 
primitive language somehow grasps the natures of things, though of course it might have 
been more convenient for expressing certain thoughts, or easier to learn. 39 
 These reflections on languages, animal and otherwise, reveal the key background 
assumption of most modern thinking about language: words are signs, established by 
convention, whose primary purpose is to allow others to discern our thoughts. This 
sounds like a truism; as we shall see, it is more controversial than first appears. Moreover, 
it is only the scaffolding on which a completed view might be erected. Much will turn, 
as we shall see, on just how one understands the claim that words are  signs . 
 3. Signs and names 
 It is not an exaggeration to say that all modern thinking about language stems from a 
single paragraph in Aristotle: 40 
 Now spoken words are symbols of affections in the soul, and written marks 
symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks are not the same for all 
men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place signs 
of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections are 
likenesses of – actual things – are also the same. 
 ( De interpretatione 16a3–8) 41 
 Spoken words are signs ( semeia in Greek; in Latin,  notae ) of passions in the mind. By 
“affections” ( pathemata ) Aristotle means not affections in our contemporary sense but 
mental representations or concepts. A word itself is an arbitrarily chosen symbol or sign 
that is in no way tied to things in the world; the work of intentionality is done wholly 
at the level of mental representations. These affections, Aristotle says, resemble or are 
likenesses of real things. On this view, the difference between parrot-speak and language 
lies in the subjective experience of the speaker. However astutely one might mimic 
the speech of a Richard Feynman, unless one has the relevant mental acts and objects, 
one is merely parroting him. Thus, a language speaker must not only be able to produce 
a variety of articulate sounds; as Locke puts it, she must also “ be able to use these sounds, 
as signs of internal conceptions .” 42 
 Each of us, on the dominant modern view, has her own idiolect, what we might call 
thoughtish. This is composed of the ideas and acts of her mind. Given our shared mental 
structures and capacities, and the fact that we inhabit a single world, all humans can in 
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principle share the same language of thought. 43 But each person’s thoughts are her own, 
accessible to others only indirectly. The role of language, then, is to turn isolated minds 
into a community of mutually intelligible beings. As Hobbes writes, “the general use of 
speech, is to transfer our mental discourse, into verbal.” 44 
 How this transference is effected is controversial. The Scholastics typically use ‘sig-
nify’ in a broad sense to mean “express,” “reveal,” or “make known.” 45 Taken in this 
sense, it is natural to say that words can also signify things, qualities, or extramental 
states of affairs. Precisely how the moderns understand signification is something we 
shall have to discover. I shall now argue that they typically construe signification in a 
much-narrower way, so that only ideas or mental acts can be signified by words. 
 Note that Aristotle’s text speaks of two relations: (R1) word–mental object and (R2) 
mental object–thing in the world. The first is signification; the second is, on Aristotle’s 
view, resemblance. A mental object represents a thing in the world in virtue of resem-
bling it. We can begin to understand signification if we contrast it with this second 
relation. 
 As we have seen, the moderns in general wish to reject the Aristotelian’s assump-
tion that each phenomenal quality we experience is a real quality in the object itself. 
(This remains the case, even though there is an exception to the rule: ideas of primary 
qualities, some philosophers such as Locke believe, do indeed resemble those quali-
ties in objects themselves.) 46 But what then is the relation between an experience of 
redness and the object itself? That is, in the case of secondary qualities, what is R2? If 
the real features of bodies are just size, shape, and movement, R2 cannot, in this case, 
be resemblance, because there is nothing in the object that our idea of yellow or sour 
resembles. Perhaps reflecting on R1 can provide a solution. Presenting his views on light 
in the early  Le Monde , Descartes exploits the Aristotelian’s use of linguistic signification 
in R1 to argue that R2 need not be understood in terms of resemblance. Addressing an 
imaginary Scholastic interlocutor, Descartes writes, 
 Words, as you well know, bear no resemblance to the things they signify, and 
yet they make us think of these things. . . . Now if words, which signify noth-
ing except by human convention, suffice to make us think of things to which 
they bear no resemblance, then why could nature not also have established 
some sign which would make us have the sensation of light, even if the sign 
contained nothing in itself which is similar to this sensation? Is it not thus that 
nature has established laughter and tears, to make us read joy and sadness on 
the faces of men? 47 
 Descartes goes on to use an example from Galileo’s  The Assayer : we experience tickling 
when certain motions occur, but there is nothing in the experience that resembles these 
motions. 48 So far, we know only that signifi cation is not resemblance. But what is it? Des-
cartes’s text offers a minimal characterization: for  x to signify  y is for  x to make us think of 
 y . As Arnauld and Nicole put it in their  Logic , “the nature of the sign consists in prompt-
ing in the senses the idea of the thing symbolized by the idea of the symbol.” 49 This can 
happen either by convention (as in words, R1) or by nature (as in sensations, R2). 
 As it stands, this Cartesian view of signs is pretty clearly flawed. Most obviously, it 
suffers from what we might call the conjunction problem. 50 Any given utterance can 
make me think of almost anything at all: ‘rain’ can make me think of the stuff that falls 
from the sky, but it can also make me think of the Teutonic songbirds Milli Vanilli or of 
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the grass withering in my yard. If this is all it takes to be a sign, then almost everything 
is a sign of almost everything else. The point is not that words are ambiguous, but rather 
even a single, univocal word can call to mind any number of things, only one (or some) 
of which is plausibly construed as its meaning in the pretheoretical sense. The same goes 
for natural signs; lactation, to use another of Aristotle’s examples, can make me think 
of pregnancy, but it can also call to mind the practice of wet-nursing or the antibiotic 
properties of mother’s milk. 
 More important, the Cartesian view focuses on only one of the jobs the moderns as a 
whole expect words to do. Locke speaks for the moderns when he claims that, because 
a person’s ideas lie hidden in his own mind and are not directly accessible to others, 
he must “be  able to use these Sounds, as Signs of internal Conceptions ; and to make them 
stand as marks for the  Ideas within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known 
to others.” 51 So we need now to look for an understanding of signification that focuses 
on this second role: not merely causing ideas in the hearer but serving as signs of ideas in 
 the speaker . Discovering just how this second role is satisfied will also allow us to answer 
the conjunction problem, both with regard to R1 and R2. 
 Because speech requires that we be able to use sounds as signs of our internal concep-
tions, it also requires that the speaker  intend to use signs in a certain way. An intention 
to reveal one’s thoughts, then, is at least a prerequisite for accomplishing the core pur-
pose of language. But how is this intention to be satisfied? 52 
 Let us return to the Port-Royal text. A sign in general is just anything that makes 
us think of something other than itself. There are many ways of causing people to form 
thoughts, however, and lumping them all together is misleading. Consider some of the 
examples the Port-Royalians use: some signs, such as maps and paintings, bring about 
the thought of what they signify by resembling, or in some way being isomorphic to, 
their objects. But this cannot be the sense of ‘sign’ in linguistic contexts. Neither the 
sound ‘map’ nor the shape of its letters resembles or maps the idea  map . (We have 
already seen Descartes exploit this fact.) We need, then, a different notion, which will 
also fall under the genus of signification. Now, Arnauld and Nicole also say that facial 
expressions are signs of emotions, that a hot cinder is a sign of a fire, and that symptoms 
indicate a disease. These things cause us to think of what they signify not by resembling 
them but by  indicating them. I suspect this is also what Aristotle means when he calls 
words  semeia ; in any case, it is pretty clearly what the moderns mean. 53 
 Hobbes makes all of this considerably clearer. He writes, 
 Now, those things we call SIGNS are the  antecedents of their consequents, and the 
consequents of their antecedents, as often as we observe them to go before or follow 
after in the same manner . For example, a thick cloud is a sign of rain to follow, 
and rain a sign that a cloud has gone before, for this reason only, that we seldom 
see clouds without the consequence of rain, nor rain at any time but when a 
cloud has gone before. And of signs, some are  natural , whereof I have already 
given an example, others are  arbitrary , namely, those we make choice of at our 
own pleasure, as a bush hung up, signifies that wine is to be sold there; a stone 
set in the ground signifies the bound of a field; and words so and so connected, 
signify the cogitations and motions of our mind. 54 
 In this famous passage, Hobbes offers a clear account of just how words function to 
reveal our thoughts to others. Natural signs can be said to mean what they signify: to use 
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an example of H. P. Grice’s, it is natural to say such things as “these spots mean measles.” 
Conventional signs are arbitrary but, when used by people intending to participate in 
those conventions, can equally well function as indicators. This is the role of words. 
 As we have seen, the Scholastics typically use ‘signify’ in a broad sense to mean 
express, reveal, or make known. It is a matter of debate among the Scholastics whether 
words signify the matter or form of things, or the substance generated by their combi-
nation. I am suggesting that most of the moderns use a considerably narrower sense: 
indication. A word does indeed make known or reveal the speaker’s ideas, but only by 
virtue of indicating them. Armed with his notion of signification, Hobbes addresses the 
Scholastic debate directly: 
 But seeing names ordered in speech (as is defined) are signs of our conceptions, 
it is manifest they are not signs of the things themselves; for that the sound 
of this word  stone should be the sign of a stone, cannot be understood in any 
sense but this, that he that hears it collects that he that pronounces it thinks 
of a stone. And, therefore, that disputation, whether names signify the matter 
or form, or something compounded of both, and other like subtleties of the 
 metaphysics , is kept up by erring men, and such as understand not the words 
they dispute about. 55 
 The argument couldn’t be simpler: because stones do not appear whenever I say the 
word ‘stone,’ it is obvious that ‘stone’ does not signify stones, but only our idea of them. 56 
It is pointless, then, to wonder whether words signify form, matter, or substance; the 
answer is, none of the above. 
 To sum up: words play at least two roles. They cause the hearer to think of an idea, 
and they indicate an idea in the mind of the speaker. (They can also serve as what 
Hobbes and Locke call marks, reminders to oneself of what one has been thinking. In 
this respect, they need not have any public use attached to them.) 57 These two roles 
are easily conflated: it is by first serving as an indication that a word attains its power to 
cause in the hearer the idea it indicates in the mind of the speaker. 58 
 Locke is the first figure I have found to explicitly separate these roles. Locke famously 
says that “words, as they are used by Men, can properly and immediately signify noth-
ing but  Ideas , that are in the Mind of the Speaker” (3.2.4: 406). (We will come back to 
the “properly and immediately” later.) It is only in their role as indications of ideas that 
words can be said to be signs. This is clear from Locke’s stipulation that they are not just 
signs of ideas but signs of ideas  in the mind of the speaker . Whether they cause the right 
ideas in one’s audience or not, words are not signs of  their ideas, but only of the speaker’s. 
 Locke of course recognizes that we hardly ever explicitly infer from a speaker’s words 
to her ideas and instead simply allow them to raise up ideas in our own minds. 59 We 
suppose that our words are indications not only of our own ideas but also of ideas in the 
minds of others. And this, Locke thinks, is simply a mistake: 
 [Men]  suppose their Words to be Marks of the Ideas  in the Minds also of other Men, 
with whom they communicate : For else they should talk in vain, and could not be 
understood, if the Sounds they applied to one  Idea , were such, as by the Hearer, 
were applied to another, which is to speak two Languages. But in this, Men 
stand not usually to examine, whether the  Idea they, and those they discourse 
with have in their Minds, be the same: But think it enough, that they use the 
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Word, as they imagine, in the common Acceptation of that Language; in which 
case they suppose, that the  Idea , they make it a sign of, is precisely the same, to 
which the Understanding Men of that Country, apply that name. 60 
 To be sure, successful communication requires that the interlocutors associate the same 
ideas with the same words. But we cannot simply assume this; given the conventional 
nature of language, it is all too common for speakers to talk past each other. 
 It is by using words as indications of, or grounds for inference to, our own thoughts 
that we make ourselves understood. How, though, does any of this help with the con-
junction problem? Having replaced the broad characterization of ‘sign’ provided by the 
Port-Royalians with the more particular concept of a sign as an indication, it might 
seem that this is a problem no longer. Not so. A spoken word might indicate an idea in 
the mind of the speaker, but it also indicates the presence of oxygen, that the speaker 
has a larynx, and so on. The same is true of our second relation, R2, that between an 
idea and what it signifies. An occurrence of the visual idea of a toad on a toadstool in my 
visual field indicates the presence of a toad, but it also indicates that I am not in outer 
space, that gravity is behaving itself, and so on. 
 There is a flip side to this objection: a spoken word does not always indicate the 
same idea on every occasion, as Locke is at pains to point out. Similarly, I do not token 
the sensory idea  frog when and only when I am in the presence of frogs: any number of 
things, from poorly seen crabs to shadows, can trigger this idea. So, what then does this 
idea signify? It seems we have to say that it signifies a disjunction: in the case of ‘frog,’ 
it signifies the disjunction of all those ideas in the minds of speakers using them, and in 
the case of the idea  frog , it signifies the disjunction of everything that causes it. This is 
the disjunction problem. 
 The clearest answer to these problems comes from Locke. Let’s begin with the case 
of ideas and their objects, relation R2. Now, some ideas – ideas of primary qualities – 
resemble what they represent, namely qualities of bodies. But  all ideas of sensation 
signify what causes them: 
 Our  simple Ideas  are all real , all agree to the reality of things. Not that they are 
all of them the Images, or Representations of what does exist, the contrary 
whereof, in all but the primary Qualities of Bodies, hath been already shewed. 
But though Whiteness and Coldness are no more in Snow, than Pain is; yet 
those  Ideas of Whiteness, and Coldness, Pain,  etc ., being in us the Effects of 
Powers in Things without us, ordained by our Maker, to produce in us such 
Sensations; they are real  Ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the Qualities, that 
are really in thing themselves. For  these several Appearances, being designed to be 
the Marks, whereby we are to know, and distinguish Things , which we have to do 
with; our  Ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing 
Characters, whether they be only constant Effects, or else exact Resemblances 
of something in the things themselves: the reality lying in that steady corre-
spondence, they have with the distinct Constitutions of real Beings. 61 
 The sensation of cold resembles nothing in the snow that caused it. What, then, is the 
use of having such a sensation, if inspecting it offers no guide to the real qualities of 
the object? Although not resembling the object, the idea of cold, we might say, causally 
co-varies with the power in the object to produce it. So, all simple ideas of sensation, 
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whether resembling anything in bodies or not, indicate those qualities that cause them. 
This is good evidence that Locke takes words to be indicators as well, assuming he uses 
‘sign’ univocally. 
 On its own, of course, the fact that some ideas represent their objects by being caused 
by them does not help with the problems we have been looking at. But Locke’s story 
is not a purely causal one: recall that ideas are “designed” or intended by God to serve 
as signs or marks of qualities in objects. So, what an idea signifies is not just anything 
that happens to cause it but what God  intended to cause it. These usually, though not 
always, overlap. Thus, given the teleological element, the disjunction problem disap-
pears. 62 The conjunction problem vanishes as well: although the occurrence of an idea 
of white indicates many things about the environment, it is only intended by God to 
indicate one thing: the presence of an object endowed with the appropriate qualities 
and powers. 63 
 The case is not so different with words. Remember that, by participating in a complex 
set of conventions, we can use words to indicate what passes in our minds. Although 
a spoken word also indicates that the speaker has a larynx, this is not what the word is 
 intended to do, considered from the point of view of this convention. 
 To make this clearer, consider another of Hobbes’s examples of a conventional sign, 
one that does not involve spoken or written language. Although a pile of stones might 
indicate anything at all, when I have reason to believe that my neighbor is aware of the 
conventions of marking the boundary of a field, I can legitimately infer that the stones 
are there for that purpose. Notice that this attributes a precise set of intentions to my 
neighbor, as well as an ability to predict mine. 
 Although few writers in the period develop this picture of language to the same 
degree as Locke, it seems to be what we might call the default setting for the moderns. 
The word-thing relation is broken into two: word-idea (R1) and idea-thing (R2). The 
analysis of R1 requires a notion of signification as indication, and at least in the case of 
secondary qualities, so does R2. 
 4. Complications and objections 
 As I have indicated, the broad outline sketched previously is fi lled out in different ways 
among the moderns. In this section, I want to discuss Hobbes’s picture in more detail 
before moving on briefl y to Locke and then to some of the most important objections 
lodged against these sorts of views. Although fi rst articulated in the modern period, 
these objections will be familiar to readers of twentieth century philosophy, where they 
resurface, though usually without any awareness of their antiquity. 
 Every noun is what Hobbes calls a “name.” Now, Hobbes is clear that some names, 
such as “man,” “tree,” and so on, are names “of the things themselves.” 64 Other names, 
like ‘nothing,’ are the names of, well, nothing. What is this relation of naming? Names 
themselves fall into two categories: marks and signs. A mark is a word taken by a single 
user as a means of recalling what he has previously thought. This use is logically and 
temporally prior to its use as a sign: once a speaker uses a name as a mark, he is then able 
to use it in such a way as to allow others to infer what he is thinking. 65 
 So far, so good; but none of this helps explain how it is that ‘dogs’ can name dogs. 
These sounds or inscriptions either mark a speaker’s own previous thoughts or signify 
those thoughts to others. Hobbes says nothing at all about the relation of naming, lead-
ing some to think that he takes it as a primitive. 66 
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 This might be the case, but I suspect there is a more charitable answer. Recall 
Hobbes’s previous claim that the only sense in which ‘stone’ can signify a stone is “that 
he that hears it collects that he that pronounces it thinks of a stone.” 67 If we want a way 
to explain how ‘stone’ can  name a stone, this is it: the word-object relation of naming 
must run through the word-idea relation (signification as indication) and from there to 
the idea-thing relation (representation, however that is accomplished). 
 We find a similar conundrum in Locke. For as often as Locke says that words signify, 
or primarily signify, nothing but ideas in the mind of the speaker, he also speaks of words 
naming or designating things. One might think that he is appealing to some further 
and primitive word-thing relation, not reducible to R1 and R2. But the text is quite 
puzzling, because Locke also says that words “are names of  Ideas .” 68 Although this is 
controversial, I find it overwhelmingly likely that Hobbes and Locke are both acquiesc-
ing in common ways of speaking and using the naming relation as a shorthand. This 
is only to be expected, because stating the two-part relation between word and object 
is rather cumbersome. 
 A second puzzle is generated by Locke’s talk of primary signification. Sometimes 
Locke says not that words signify nothing but ideas in the mind of the speaker but 
that they  primarily do so, implying that in some secondary sense they signify things 
themselves. 69 Unfortunately, Locke never so much as uses the phrase “secondary sig-
nification,” or anything remotely like it. It was fairly common in late Scholasticism to 
distinguish between the primary signification of words, namely ideas, and their second-
ary signification, namely things. But Locke clearly intends his claim about words to tell 
against these same Scholastics, as we shall see later. Why, then, would he be helping 
himself to some of their jargon? 
 Again, I think the answer is convenience. We have seen Hobbes claim that there is 
indeed a sense in which words signify things. It would be natural enough for Locke to 
have this same sense in mind – words secondarily signify things in the sense that they 
signify ideas, which in turn represent things. Even if Locke’s occasional talk of “primary 
signification” implies a notion of secondary signification, he need not be read as intro-
ducing an irreducible and novel category of linguistic function. 70 
 Before moving forward, we should note just how foreign this picture of language 
is to many twentieth century philosophers. Ian Hacking (1975) goes so far as to deny 
that any of these figures, particularly Hobbes, actually  has a theory of meaning. Though 
hyperbolic, Hacking’s point is a useful guard against anachronism: the Fregean notions 
of sense and reference really have no place in the moderns. A stone at the edge of a 
field is just not the right sort of thing to refer, or have a sense; it merely indicates. Nor 
do words, in and of themselves, carry with them any mode of presentation or reference. 
This is hardly surprising, given the use the moderns think words must be put to: words 
serve only as the means by which we make our thoughts known to one another. It is the 
thoughts themselves that present things in a given way and refer to or pick out individu-
als in the world. Indeed, if one is determined to find an analogue for  Sinn and  Bedeutung 
in the modern period, the best place to look is not words but ideas. 71 The Port-Royal 
 Logic , for instance, speaks of an idea’s comprehension– “the attributes that it contains 
in itself ” – and its extension– “the subjects to which the idea applies.” 72 
 Before going on to show how this picture gives the moderns some tools with which 
to attack their opponents, we should consider three fairly obvious objections. 
 First, this indicator approach to language can seem hopelessly myopic. Even if it is 
suited to explaining the fact-stating uses of words, 73 it seems to ignore a wide variety 
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of linguistic acts. Words can be used to embarrass, attack, promise, and so on, and on, 
and on. Although it is common to associate this sort of insight with J. L. Austin in the 
twentieth century, George Berkeley in the eighteenth was to make this a core issue in 
his debate with Locke. 74 And recognition of such other uses of words comes early on in 
the modern period. We have already looked at Descartes’s discussion of the use of sounds 
to indicate emotions or pain (though of course he does not think these uses amount to 
a use of  language per se .) Hobbes, too, makes a point of discussing the use of speech to 
express emotions. 75 Hobbes also is keenly aware that people sometimes speak in order 
to please others; he lists this among the uses of language, alongside its role as signifier 
of ideas. (Hobbes lists the use of language to injure or “grieve” others among its abuses.) 
Given the driving forces behind the moderns’ interests in language, it should hardly be 
surprising that they largely neglect the non-fact-stating uses of language. What is more, 
many of these other uses of language are parasitic on its role as a means of communica-
tion. No one could use the phrase ‘Sellars said so’ as a means of intellectual intimidation 
if it did not straightforwardly signify a set of ideas and mental acts. 
 Second, even when we confine ourselves to these fact-stating uses of language, it 
seems absurd to say that words signify ideas. Don’t we also need words to talk about 
 things ? J. S. Mill writes that “[w]hen I say, ‘the sun is the cause of the day,’ I do not mean 
that my idea of the sun causes or excites in me the idea of the day.” 76 But this criticism 
misses the mark by assuming that if words  signify ideas, they are about or  refer to those 
ideas. Nothing could be further from the sense in which the moderns understand lin-
guistic signification. 77 
 Our final objection is more fundamental, and stems from the privacy of the ideas 
and acts the moderns think words are used to signify. If my mental life is never open to 
inspection by others, how can I use words to reveal it to them? This is really two points: 
(1) because ideas are, as Locke says, “all within [a man’s] own Breast, invisible, and hid-
den from others,” 78 there is no way to check whether we are speaking the same language 
or merely using homonyms. Moreover, (2) it is impossible to ever get the conventions 
necessary for communication off the ground, because there is no way for us to agree 
to use a word as a sign of a given idea. To do  that , we would have to have some other 
convention already in place. Although these criticisms are most often associated with 
Wittgenstein and Frege, they were first pressed by John Sergeant, the maverick Catholic 
priest who in 1694 published a lengthy critique of Locke’s  Essay . Sergeant writes, 
 Our words are  ad placitum , and have no  Natural Connexion with the Things 
they signifie, but are order’d to express them by the  Agreement of Mankind: 
Therefore what’s signified by them, must be  fore-known to that Agreement. But 
the  Ideas . . . we have, cannot be  fore-known to this Agreement, since they could 
not be at all known, ( being in the Mind ,) but by the  Words ; which, not being yet 
agreed on, can make known, or signifie, nothing. 79 
 How can we, as a group, decide that ‘tree’ will signify the idea of a tree, when we have 
no public means of pointing to the idea? 
 To see Locke’s answer, we must note that Sergeant assumes that it is  only by means of 
words that make our ideas known to others. This is the point Locke will deny. On his 
view, language first gets going by means of ostensive definition (and indeed any word 
for a simple idea can  only be defined by ostension). One says ‘tree,’ points to a tree, and 
hopes the other person cottons on. There is no guarantee that she will, but given our 
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very similar cognitive and perceptual equipment, plus a good deal of trial and error, it 
seems to work. Thus, ostensive definition is necessary at the start of language. It also 
provides an answer to (2): how can I check that my interlocutor understands me? Only 
by using other words and ultimately, in the limiting case, “ by presenting to his Senses that 
Subject, which may produce it in his Mind , and mak[ing] him actually have the  Idea , the 
word stands for.” 80 This move is hardly uncontroversial, of course; philosophers from 
Augustine to Wittgenstein have argued that ostensive definition, used in this way, is 
problematic. Answering their critiques would take us too far afield, but it does seem to 
me that the difficulties have been exaggerated. 
 It is worth pausing to examine Sergeant’s own positive view, because he represents 
one of the few dissenting voices to what I have represented as the dominant view among 
the moderns. Sergeant rejects the way of ideas in part because he thinks our speech is 
directly about real things; for him, words reach right out to the world, as it were. But this 
is not to say that he anticipates Frege or Kripke. On the contrary, his claim is founded on 
the puzzling doctrine that numerically the same thing can have what Sergeant calls two 
“manners of existence”: in the body, materially, and in the mind, immaterially. When I 
think of a cathedral, the cathedral itself, on Sergeant’s view, exists in my mind. Whether 
this is a clever anticipation of John McDowell’s doctrine of object-dependent thought 
or a hopeless muddle, or both, is an open question. 81 
 5. Definitions 
 With this sketch of the dominant modern conception of signifi cation in place, we 
can begin to look at some of its consequences. Undoubtedly the modern philoso-
pher to make the most hay of the nature of signifi cation is Locke. Locke did not set 
out to include in the  Essay a book on language. Having fi nished his account of the 
origin of ideas in book 2, Locke had intended to proceed straightaway to a discus-
sion of knowledge. But he found that “there is so close a connexion between  Ideas 
and Words” that he was unable to treat knowledge until he had fi rst considered the 
nature of language. 82 By far the largest portion of book 3 is negative; it takes its place 
in Locke’s project as “under-labourer” for the sciences, clearing away the rubbish of 
Scholasticism. 
 Nowhere is this more evident than in his chapter on the abuse of words. The fifth 
abuse Locke discusses is “ setting them in the place of Things, which they do or can by no 
means signify .” 83 Although words like ‘man’ or ‘gold’ 
 signify nothing truly but a complex  Idea of Properties, united together in one 
sort of Substances: Yet there is scarce any Body in the use of these Words, but 
often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having the real Essence, 
on which those properties depend. 84 
 It is natural, though quite mistaken, for us to assume that our words directly reach out 
to things. Locke recognizes that his readers will likely be chagrinned to learn that they 
can at best use words to signify their own thoughts. 85 When I say “nitrate fertilizers are 
explosive,” I don’t want simply to say that the idea of explosivity is contained in my idea 
of nitrate fertilizers; I “tacitly suppose,” to use Locke’s phrase, that I am referring to the 
stuff itself, the fertilizer, and saying that its real essence produces its explosive powers. 86 
But this supposition is always false. 
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 Recall that a completed Aristotelian science would be a network of definitions and other 
propositions connected by syllogisms. These definitions have the status of first principles, 
starting points from which the rest of the network is derived. If Locke is right, however, any 
definition is nothing but a report of the contents of one’s own ideas. Why? Simply because 
the words used in those definitions can, like all words, only signify mental contents. 87 
 On Locke’s view, an awareness of this fact about language would put a stop to the vast 
majority of disputes, in philosophy and out of it. Is a bat a bird or not? Is this  really gold 
or isn’t it? Is this a particularly hirsute baby or a monster? 88 The only thing you can do is 
consult your abstract idea of these kinds, what Locke calls their nominal essences, and 
figure it out. There just is no further fact of the matter. 89 The tendency to think that 
these questions are important – that answering them would tell us something, not about 
our own ideas, but about the world – is just another unhappy result of the tendency to 
think that words signify the things themselves. 
 In addition to these nominal essences, Locke acknowledges that there are real 
essences: “the real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of 
Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend.” 90 It is a serious mistake to think 
of Lockean real essences as substitutes for Aristotelian essences, suitably rigged up for 
the mechanical philosophy. Among other things, Aristotelian essences are supposed to 
be what they are regardless of anyone’s conceptual activity. 91 A man is a man and not a 
duck no matter how anyone conceives of the two kinds. Now, at the level of tokens, this 
is quite true of a Lockean real essence: there is some hidden arrangement of corpuscles 
that gives this particular thing we call a duck its observable qualities. But it is not true 
at the level of types, or kinds: there is nothing out there that really marks off one such 
arrangement from another. As Locke says, “ Essence , even in this [i.e. the real] sense, 
 relates to a sort , and supposes a  Species .” 92 Even if all our epistemic limitations were lifted 
and we had a God’s-eye view of the corpuscles of a body, we would still be deploying 
our abstract idea  duck when we asked after the real essence of this species. What is more 
important, there is no reason to suppose that for each set of properties we track with our 
nominal essences there corresponds a unique  real essence. 93 
 Here it is instructive to look at Leibniz’s critique of Locke in the  New Essays . 94 In 
response to Locke’s assertion that words signify nothing but thoughts, Leibniz simply 
asserts that “things as well as ideas are indicated [ marquées ] by words.” 95 Thus when 
Locke inveighs against the practice of putting words in the place of things they cannot 
signify, Leibniz replies that “it [is] obviously wrong to criticize this common usage.” 96 
Having simply rejected Locke’s claims about the limits of the signification of words, 
Leibniz, as a result, turns a deaf ear to the strictures Locke would infer from them. What 
is more striking, Leibniz provides no account of how it could be that  things are signified 
or indicated ( marquées ) by words. 
 On Locke’s view, then, definitions are of words, not of things, and these definitions, 
even under epistemically idealized conditions, yield only the constituent ideas that we 
associate with the word. The limits of language are the limits of our ideas. Now, Locke 
thinks that recognizing this requires one to give up the Aristotelian project of natural 
philosophy as confused. 97 But of course it is open to the Aristotelian to simply identify a 
thing’s essence with our idea of it, a trick we have seen Sergeant turn with his doctrine 
of “notions.” Indeed, Locke sometimes presents his opponents’ view as the claim that 
the essences of things  just are our ideas. 98 
 In a similar vein, Cartesians like Arnauld and Nicole, although abandoning the 
framework of Aristotelian hylomorphism, hold that some definitions of ideas capture 
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an eternal essence. ‘Triangle,’ on their view, can be given either a nominal definition, in 
which case it is merely stipulative, 99 or a real definition, which expresses the constituent 
parts of the idea we have agreed to signify by the term ‘triangle.’ 100 Real definitions, on 
their view, can be true or false, and require argument. Unlike nominal definitions, they 
cannot simply be assumed at the outset of a demonstration. It is no surprise, then, to 
find Cartesian critics of Spinoza’s  Ethics arguing that he begs the question by offering no 
argument for the definitions on which his system depends. 101 
 It is hard to know, however, precisely what the Port-Royalians are asking for when 
they demand an argument for a purportedly real definition. Leibniz makes this much 
clearer when he says that a real definition must reveal the possibility of the thing 
defined. 102 When this is done  a priori , a real definition of, for example, a triangle shows 
how the properties of a triangle can be combined without contradiction. 103 A real defi-
nition is also, for Leibniz, a causal definition, in the sense that it “contains the possible 
generation of the thing” (1989, 57). 
 This last remark signals yet another notion of definition in the modern period, one 
that also has Aristotelian roots. On this view, definitions should, as Hobbes puts it, 
capture the “cause and generation” of anything that has them. Hobbes here takes his 
cue from geometry, “the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow upon 
mankind.” 104 The proper definition of a circle, for example, is the circumduction of a 
straight line in a plane. 105 Definitions should embody a kind of maker’s knowledge, a 
recipe for bringing about the thing defined. Similarly, we find Spinoza claiming that 
definitions of created things must include their proximate causes. 106 
 6. Reasoning and universals 
 The moderns as a whole are united, as we have seen, in the view that the role of 
language is to make publicly available the private goings-on of one’s mind. Although 
this is Hobbes’s offi cial view, he also suggests a quite different picture according to 
which some reasoning can be done only with words. This violates the typical two-
tiered structure, with mental discourse serving as the primary bearer of intentionality 
and meaning, and verbal, whether written or spoken, imperfectly mirroring thought. 
Hobbes makes the radical suggestion that language use might be in some way constitu-
tive of reasoning itself. 107 
 Reasoning, for Hobbes, is nothing more or less than “ reckoning , that is, adding and 
subtracting, of the consequences of general names agreed upon for the  marking and  sig-
nifying of our thoughts.” 108 On Hobbes’s computational theory of the mind, reasoning 
proceeds by quite literally adding and subtracting either words or concepts. But, as we 
shall see, Hobbes thinks that only words are universal. That is, as far as the subject’s 
interior life goes, only particulars are the objects of thought. Note that this is quite dif-
ferent from a view that says that ideas themselves can be universal, or at least that their 
immediate intentional objects can be general in the sense that they pick out a class of 
particulars. On Hobbes’s view, only words themselves can range over particulars. 
 This feature of Hobbes’s view puts him squarely in the bull’s-eye of Descartes and 
his fellow travelers. In an admittedly odd objection to Descartes’s wax argument, 
Hobbes writes, 
 Now, what shall we say if it turns out that reasoning is simply the joining together 
and linking of names or labels by means of the verb “is”? It would follow that 
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the inferences in our reasoning tell us nothing at all about the natures of things, 
but merely tell us about the labels applied to them; that is, all we can infer is 
whether or not we are combining the names of things in accordance with the 
arbitrary conventions which we have laid down in respect of their meaning. 109 
 Descartes fi nds this so silly he cannot believe anyone even entertained it. For Descartes, 
reasoning is “not a linking of names but of the things that are signifi ed by the names.” 110 
Like Leibniz in his objection to Locke, Descartes does not bother to explain how  things 
can be joined together. Obviously, he does not have in mind physically connecting 
things, as if building an Erector set were reasoning; at most he can mean that the things 
themselves are linked in the sense that our ideas represent them, and the ideas are 
joined in a proposition or judgment. As Descartes goes on to point out, it is not clear 
where precisely Hobbes disagrees: after all, Hobbes himself holds that phantasms or 
ideas represent bodies and their accidents, and that our ideas are signifi ed by words. To 
this extent, then, reasoning can indeed be about things. 
 This passage of Hobbes’s has often been taken to mean that he endorses a “Humpty-
Dumpty” theory of meaning and truth. Hobbes’s emphasis on the arbitrary nature of 
linguistic convention seems to indicate that what makes a proposition true is simply 
whether it accords with these conventions. Thus, Leibniz famously calls Hobbes a 
“super-nominalist,” who believes that “the truth of things itself consists in names and 
what is more, that it depends on the human will, because truth allegedly depends on the 
definitions of terms, and definitions depend on the human will.” 111 
 We have already seen that Hobbesian definitions do not depend on the human will, 
in any interesting sense. So, Hobbes cannot consistently mean what Leibniz, Descartes, 
and the Port-Royalians think he means. Moreover, as Arnauld and Nicole point out, the 
claim that truth is arbitrary does not follow from the fact that the imposition of words is 
arbitrary. Once the signification of the relevant words is settled, whether a proposition 
is true or not is as objective as anything could be. 
 What, then, is Hobbes getting at it in his objection to Descartes? To answer this ques-
tion, we need to look at the consequence Hobbes infers: 
 If this is so, as may well be the case, reasoning will depend on names, names will 
depend on the imagination, and imagination will depend (as I believe it does) 
merely on the motions of our bodily organs; and so the mind will be nothing 
more than motion occurring in various parts of an organic body. 112 
 The real point of Hobbes’s claim that reasoning depends on names, which in turn 
depend on imagination, is to counter Descartes’s dualism. As we have seen, Descartes 
takes reason, the universal instrument, to be one of the features that separates man 
not just from other animals but from  any corporeal being. Nothing can at once reason 
and be merely corporeal. Hobbes’s objection is a direct challenge to this view: Hobbes 
promises to explain the phenomena of reasoning purely through words and imagination. 
The imagination, which includes memory, is conceded by all parties to the debate to be 
purely corporeal. Thus, no Cartesian intellect need apply. 113 
 Seen in this materialist light, Hobbes’s position comes into focus. A true proposition, 
he thinks, is one in which the predicate contains or comprehends its subject – for exam-
ple ‘mammal’ contains or encompasses ‘whale.’ 114 This is a purely extensional theory of 
truth: what makes “whales are mammals” true is the fact that the word ‘mammals’ has 
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been applied to a certain class of beings, and ‘whale’ has been applied to a subset of this 
class. In one sense, why  these names (and not others) have been applied has no good 
answer: we could just as well have spoken of ‘shwales’ and ‘shmammals.’ In another, it 
has a perfectly good answer: we have applied these names in such a way as to track the 
resemblances and differences in the phantasms caused by these things. 115 It is then mis-
leading to say that, for Hobbes, reasoning about kinds consists in the mere manipulation 
of words. And it is this further story – one spelled out in the vocabulary of phantasms 
and objective resemblances – that prevents his view from falling into supernominalism. 
 7. Propositions 
 If the questions of defi nition and reasoning occasioned debate in the modern period, 
the question of propositions generated something like consensus. The intriguing issue is 
just what the object of this consensus amounts to. As we shall see, in its baldest state-
ments, it seems vulnerable to a fairly obvious objection. Although the moderns as a 
whole have a good answer to one question about propositions, namely what elevates a 
mere string of words to the status of a proposition, this answer seems to commit them 
to a wildly implausible view of the attitudes (e.g. belief, dissent, supposition, doubt) we 
adopt toward them. 
 One useful way into the question of propositions is afforded by an influential objec-
tion to Hobbes’s view. Hobbes holds that the copula is superfluous: there might be “some 
nations” that have no word that corresponds to our word ‘is.’ 116 Peter Geach writes, “we 
might very well object that it [the copula] is necessary, because a pair of names is not 
a proposition but a list.” 117 ‘Whales mammals,’ for example, does not assert anything, 
nor does it admit of a truth value. Add the copula (‘whales are mammals’) and you get 
something with both these features. So, the copula, for Geach, is an essential element 
in any proposition: it unites the subject and predicate into a complex that admits of a 
truth value. 
 But Hobbes in fact endorses Geach’s point: Hobbes thinks that a proposition “ is a 
speech consisting of two names copulated, by which he that speaketh signifies he conceives the 
latter name to be the name of the same thing whereof the former is the name .” 118 What, then, 
is going on? Hobbes, I suggest, is pointing out that there is nothing essential in the 
grammatical form: we might indicate how we conceive of the names in question by our 
tone of voice rather than by ‘is,’ ‘est,’ or what have you. Hobbes and Geach agree that 
the job of the copula must get done; Hobbes simply denies that it needs to be done by 
a distinct syntactic unit. 
 This concern with what unites words or ideas in a proposition and distinguishes prop-
ositions from lists can be found as far back as Aristotle’s  De interpretatione (16a10–19) 
and runs right through the modern period. But where Hobbes focuses on names, and 
makes speech essential to the formation of a proposition, most of his fellow travelers 
take the more traditional line that there are purely mental, as well as verbal, proposi-
tions, and that the role of a verbal proposition is to mirror the mental proposition. 
 Thus, a more typical pronouncement is to be found in the Port-Royal  Logic : 
 [a]fter conceiving things by our ideas, we compare these ideas, and, finding 
that some belong together and others do not, we unite or separate them. This 
is called  affirming or  denying , and in general  judging . . . [and] this judgment is 
also called a  proposition . 119 
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 As with Hobbes, it is crucial that a judgment or proposition consists not merely of a 
pair of ideas or words but of these items combined or taken in a certain way. Similar 
pronouncements can be found in Locke. 120 ‘Is’ signifi es not another idea but rather a 
mental act. To this extent, Locke departs from his blanket claim that all words signify 
ideas in the mind of the speaker. Some of them must signify mental acts. 121 
 The problem with this dominant view is not hard to see. Take the proposition “[i]f a 
creature’s will can obstruct the absolute will of God, God is not omnipotent.” The ante-
cedent here is itself a proposition: a creature’s will can obstruct the absolute will of God. 
And yet when I assert the conditional, I am not, of course, asserting the antecedent. 122 
Nor am I asserting the consequent, namely that God is not omnipotent. And yet each is 
itself a proposition, which entails that I find that the constituent ideas agree or disagree. 
To even think “God is not omnipotent” is, it seems, to assent to this proposition: I have 
to  find that the ideas  God and  omnipotent disagree. The very nature of a judgment or a 
proposition, it seems, precludes any attitude toward that proposition other than assent. 
And this is absurd. 123 
 It is not as if the moderns are somehow blinkered to the obvious fact that not every 
proposition we entertain, whether in the context of a conditional or not, is not an object 
of assent. In fact, the previous example is drawn from the Port-Royal  Logic itself. 124 But 
providing for the unity of the proposition as the moderns do seemingly makes it impos-
sible to account for propositional attitudes. 
 What, then, are we to conclude? Could the Port-Royal logicians and Locke have 
been so inconsistent as to insist on the possibility of entertaining a proposition with-
out assenting to it and in the same breath offering an analysis that makes this flatly 
impossible? One possible move is to claim that the subpropositional use of ‘is’ is not 
equivalent to assertion. That is, an affirmation is not necessarily an assertion. There 
are two acts that need to be performed: a union of subject and predicate, and then the 
adoption of an attitude toward the resulting proposition. The skeptic can argue that 
such a reading is precluded by the Port-Royalians’ talk of  finding that the subject and 
predicate agree or disagree. But if  finding entails assent, it has an even more dire con-
sequence: one cannot find that two ideas agree, for example, when those ideas  do not 
agree. ‘Find,’ like ‘see,’ is a success term. Taken at face value, then, the Port-Royalian 
view makes it impossible not only to entertain a proposition without assenting to it 
but also to assent to a proposition that it is not in fact true. Considerations of charity 
must be played off textual considerations to achieve some kind of equilibrium, and 
it is plausible to read the Port-Royalians, and Locke, as holding that the affirmation 
involved in constructing any proposition is only provisional, and can be canceled by 
further acts of the mind. 125 
 Not all the moderns agree that a judgment or proposition requires a further act of 
the mind beyond that of conceiving of an idea alone. Some think that to entertain the 
proposition that  x is  F , for example, is just to have a single idea. In other words, the 
traditional distinction between conceiving and judging is collapsed. This doctrine has 
its source in Descartes and comes to fruition, if one wants to call it that, in Spinoza. It 
lives on in the next century in the work of Hume. 126 
 Here again we can begin with a contemporary objection. Descartes is often painted 
as an epistemic voluntarist, that is someone who thinks that the will is always free to 
affirm or deny any proposition at all. 127 Judgment, for Descartes, is an act of the will, 
and so, the objection goes, he thinks that the mind can either affirm or deny any 
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proposition. This is obviously false: I cannot will myself to disbelieve 2 + 2 = 4, no 
matter how hard I try. 
 That the objection is wrongheaded can be seen from Descartes’s analysis of will: 
 [T]he will . . . consists simply in the fact that when the intellect puts something 
forward for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations 
are such that we do not feel we are determined  by any external force . 128 
 This leaves open that we can be determined by an  internal force, namely the light of 
reason. The more clearly I understand a true proposition like 2 + 2 = 4, the more I find 
affirming it irresistible, and the more free my will is in affirming it. 
 Spinoza takes this as his starting point in analyzing propositions. For him, what most 
moderns take to be distinct acts – forming an idea and then combining it with others to 
generate a proposition – are conflated. Any act of the will just is an affirmation or nega-
tion, and these are identical to the ideas most moderns would take as their objects. His 
argument is roughly as follows: because conception and affirmation (or negation) are 
always, and necessarily, found together, there can be no real distinction between them. 
As Spinoza writes, “[t]here is in the mind no volition, that is, affirmation and negation, 
except that which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves.” 129 Take the claim (P) that 
the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Now, we cannot affirm (P) 
without having the idea of a triangle. Conversely, and more controversially, we can-
not, Spinoza thinks, have the idea of a triangle without affirming (P). So, affirming (P) 
“belongs to the essence of the idea of a triangle.” 
 Although not directly an influence on later philosophers, like Hume, who also reduce 
judgment to conception, Spinoza’s position represents a novel and radical departure 
from the Aristotelian tradition. But if the traditional view faces the problem of propo-
sitional attitudes, Spinoza’s is undone by it. However plausible as an account of  a priori 
necessary propositions, Spinoza’s view cannot make sense of any other. 
 8. Definite descriptions and the limits of thought 
 Syncategorematic terms – words like ‘is,’ ‘of,’ ‘and,’ and ‘but’ – are crucial not just in con-
structing propositions but in expressing their connection. Locke gives an astute analysis 
of ‘but,’ tracing its different roles in indicating postures that the mind adopts toward 
propositions. As we have seen, it is not clear whether the tradition in which Locke 
stands can offer an analysis of the proposition consistent with these postures. 
 What concerns us in this section, however, is the role of syncategoremata in con-
structing what contemporary philosophers call definite descriptions. Syncategoremata 
are subpropositional elements that are nevertheless not just noun, or noun-adjective, 
combinations. ‘That tapir over there’ includes not just a sign of the idea of a tapir but 
words indicating further mental acts. As we shall see, they play an indispensable role in 
extending the bounds of sense. 130 
 The best starting point is the exchange between Hobbes and Descartes. Hobbes argues 
that we have no ideas of God or substance; these are established by inference but not 
given in any idea. 131 Substance, for example, “is something that is established solely by 
reasoning; it is not something that is conceived, or that presents any idea to us.” 132 The 
Port-Royalians, endorsing what I have called the default modern view of signification, 
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draw the obvious conclusion: “if we had no idea of God, in uttering the name ‘God’ we 
would conceive only these three letters, ‘G,’ ‘o,’ ‘d.’ ” 133 Using language to communicate 
requires that we have a single idea for each categorematic word we utter. 
 What has Hobbes to say for himself? To establish that  x exists by means of inference 
or reasoning obviously requires that I first have some way to think and talk about  x . 
Moreover, it is hard to see how Hobbes could deny that we “conceive” of substance and 
yet claim that we know it exists. For a coherent development of Hobbes’s insights in his 
exchange with Descartes, we have to look to Locke. 
 Consider Locke’s own analysis of substance. Construed as an ultimate substratum or 
underpinning of qualities, substance is not a possible object of experience. 134 It is not 
a macroscopic quality that can cause ideas in us, but the cushion in which the pins of 
qualities stick. Thus, Locke’s own index entry for “substance” reads “S. no idea of it.” 135 
At the same time, Locke clearly thinks that we  do , in some sense, have an idea of sub-
stance; otherwise the word would be nonsense. Locke’s ambivalence can be accounted 
for by seeing the difference between thinking of  x in virtue of having a single idea that 
represents  x and in virtue of having a string of ideas and acts that jointly represent  x . 
Only in the latter sense can we have an “idea” of substance. “That which underlies and 
supports qualities” does not signify a single idea in the mind of the speaker but rather a 
complex of ideas and mental acts, much as a proposition must include words that signify 
ideas and the mental act of combination or separation. 136 “Substance” is an abbreviated 
definite description. 
 Bertrand Russell takes definite descriptions to be the only means by which an empiri-
cist avoids idealism. 137 In the same way, Locke uses them to extend the limits of thought 
beyond ideas and even the objects they represent. By structuring ideas and mental acts 
in the right way, we can transcend the narrow limits imposed by the veil, or better, the 
window, of ideas. For the very same reason, Locke’s use of descriptions makes him the 
target of later empiricists. 
 Although Berkeley ultimately goes on to endorse a substance view of the mind, he 
entertains in his notebooks a Humean picture, on which the mind is nothing more 
than an aggregate of ideas. Arguing against the Lockean view, Berkeley writes, “Say you 
the Mind is not the Perceptions. but that thing wch perceives. I answer you are abus’d 
by the words that & thing these are vague empty words wthout a meaning.” 138 Here, 
Berkeley zeroes in on precisely the syncategorematic terms so vital to Lockean definite 
descriptions. The words ‘that’ and ‘thing’ are denied a meaning because they cannot be 
correlated with any ideas. Having taken over what he (mis)takes as Locke’s philosophy 
of language, namely the view that all words signify ideas, Berkeley can accuse Locke 
of inconsistency: ‘that’ does not signify any idea at all (it is “empty” and “without a 
meaning”). 139 But on Locke’s real view, ‘that’ can nevertheless be significant, because it 
indicates an act of the mind. 
 The issue of definite descriptions has clear ramifications for later thinkers. One of the 
most striking features of Hume’s emaciated empiricism is its refusal even to entertain 
Lockean definite descriptions as a means of thinking about that which is permanently 
hidden from experience. Might this not be a result of his view of the nature of the 
proposition, and his rejection of syncategorematic terms as signifying anything over and 
above one’s ideas? 
 Because this topic is the most obvious link to the debates of the eighteenth cen-




 9. Conclusion 
 If this chapter licenses any lesson, it is that philosophy of language in the seventeenth 
century is a vast and lively battlefi eld, distinguished by skirmishes and sometimes routs. 
Its front lines extend to many of the core issues in metaphysics. And if the background 
assumptions that structure the debate are foreign to us, if it is fought on terrain we fi nd 
diffi cult to map, that makes it all the more instructive. For throwing our own assump-
tions into stark relief is surely one of the ways in which the history of philosophy matters 
to philosophy. 140 
 10. Further reading 
 The best place to start is Ian Hacking’s classic  Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? 
(1975). In a lucid and accessible style, Hacking argues for some intriguing positions and 
makes the fi rst sustained foray into the history of the philosophy of language, all the 
while keeping one eye on contemporary debates. 
 More recently, Michael Losonsky’s  Linguistic Turns in Modern Philosophy (2007a) cov-
ers much the same territory, though in a very different way. Losonsky’s theme is the split 
between those approaches to language that treat it as a formal system and those that 
treat it as a practical tool for communication. Like Hacking, Losonsky begins in the 
seventeenth century and continues through the twentieth. 
 Finally, two special issues of journals are well worth reading.  Synthese (1988), titled 
“Thought and Language in the Philosophy of the Enlightenment,” contains a number 
of important pieces, particularly on Locke, Descartes, and Berkeley. And  Philosophia 
(2009) includes the proceedings of a 2008 conference titled “Meaning and Modern 
Empiricism.” 
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  1  Leviathan (hereafter, “Lev”), I.v: 36–7. References to Lev are in the following form: part.chapter: page 
number in Hobbes (1839–45), vol. 3. 
  2 It is important not to be misled by the moderns’ wide use of “name.” This encompasses not just what 
we think of as proper names but nearly any noun or noun-adjective complex. 
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think of individuals, though not  qua individuals. 
  4 This is Locke’s official position. His argument for God’s existence in  Essay 4.10, however, creates prob-
lems for this agnosticism. For more on this, see Downing (2007). References to Locke’s  Essay are to 
Locke (1975) and are in the following form: book.chapter.section: page number, if applicable. 
  5 The connection between universality and immateriality runs throughout many of the early moderns. 
For example, at least early in his career, Gassendi argued that, being material, our minds cannot enter-
tain genuine universals. For more on this, see LoLordo (2007: 234f.) 
  6 In this opening section, I run roughshod over many differences among the moderns; these will emerge 
in the following sections. 
  7 I do not wish to underestimate the degree to which Aristotelianism is heterogeneous. It is misleading, 
though extremely convenient, to speak of “the” Aristotelian view. Many views we think of as distinctive 
of the early modern period were prefigured in the tremendous array of positions flying under the banner 
of Aristotelianism. Nevertheless, this particular “ism” does point to a family of views that have some 
common commitments. 
  8 1629 Letter to Mersenne (CSM III 10f). References are to Descartes (1984) and in the following form: 
volume, page number. 
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  9 For another example, see the Port-Royal  Logic I.11: 58f. References are to part, chapter, and page num-
ber in Arnauld and Nicole (1996). 
 10 “Idol” is the standard translation for Bacon’s  idola ; Michael Silverthorne (in Bacon 2000) makes a good 
case for translating it as “illusion,” and indeed this seems to be how the English cognate of the word was 
understood at the time. Hobbes, for example, writes that demons are “idols or phantasms of the brain, 
without any real nature of their own” (Lev IV.44: 605.) 
 11  The New Organon I.xxxviii in Bacon (2000: 40). 
 12 See Hobbes, Lev I.i: 3. 
 13 As Galileo puts it in  The Assayer , “[j]ust because we have given special names to these qualities, dif-
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 14 Spinoza (2002: 24); see  Theological-Political Treatise (2002: 505) for the claim that words acquire mean-
ing through their use. In an intriguing article, David Savan (1973) argues that Spinoza’s views on 
language entail that the true philosophy is unstatable: given Spinoza’s view that words are a part of the 
imagination, Savan claims, they cannot mirror the intellect, as truth requires. But see the rejoinder by 
G.H.R. Parkinson in the same volume. 
 15 For more on this, see esp. Dawson (2007), though I think she tends to exaggerate the moderns’ anxiety 
about these issues. 
 16 Lev I.4: 25. 
 17 Port-Royal  Logic I.11: 58. 
 18 For some Scholastics, such as Aquinas, “definition” means only the definiens, not the entire proposi-
tion. I ignore this complication here. 
 19 See Aristotle’s  Posterior Analytics and esp. Aquinas’s commentary (1970). 
 20 See esp. Descartes’s appendix to Fifth Replies, CSM II 271; see also  Rules for the Direction of the Mind , 
CSM I 36, 51. 
 21 See esp. Nuchelmans (1998c: 133f.) 
 22 Glanvill (1665: 143). 
 23  New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (hereafter, “NE”) III.xvii: 478. Page numbers refer to the 
Akademie edition (Leibniz 1990) and are followed by Bennett and Remnant (Leibniz 1996). Transla-
tions of NE are those of Bennett and Remnant unless noted. See also Nuchelmans (1998c: 133f.) 
 24 NE III.x.xvii: 478. 
 25 It is also worth noting that the structure of a Scholastic textbook in logic – beginning with individual 
terms, then moving to propositions, to formal reasoning, and finally to general remarks about logical 
method – lives on in many modern works. This is explicit in the Port-Royal  Logic and in Hobbes’s logic, 
book I of his  De Corpore ; it is perhaps implicit in the structure of Locke’s  Essay . Book 1 aside, we can 
think of book 2 as focusing on the mental counterparts of categorematic words, book 3 on propositions, 
and book 4 on method. 
 26 CSM I 139–40. 
 27 John Cottingham calls this problem “the disappearing soul”: if everything from nutrition to locomotion 
to pain avoidance can be explained mechanically, what is left for the Cartesian soul to do? See Cot-
tingham (1992). 
 28 CSM I 140. 
 29 CSM I 140. 
 30 CSM III 303. 
 31 This is an intriguing point in Descartes’s argument. Although the use of signs in the ways specified 
seems to be set up here as an indication of both reason and thought, the madman’s speech “does not 
follow reason,” and yet still counts as an indication of thought. That Descartes distinguishes between 
reason and thought is evident in the 1649  Passions of the Soul , Descartes’s last work, where he says that 
beasts “have no reason, nor perhaps any thought” (CSM I 348). So, although language use is a sufficient 
condition for thought, it is not one of reason. 
 32 Compositionality as a criterion of languagehood becomes explicit in Berkeley: “[i]t is the articulation, 
combination, variety, copiousness, extensive and general use and easy application of signs . . . that 
constitute the true nature of language,”  Alciphron Dialogue IV, section 12, in Berkeley (1949–58, vol. 5: 
157). 
   In taking language use to be the primary means of discerning reasoning (or at least thinking) beings 
from those that are not, Descartes is unusual in the period we are examining. The debate that ensues 
focuses squarely on the attribution of thought, whether the animal is a language user or not. See, for 
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in the ability to abstract, not in the possession of thought, ideas, or language. See also the exchange 
between Philalethes (Locke’s spokesman) and Theophilus (who represents Leibniz’s own views) in the 
latter’s NE: 142–5. 
 33 CSM III 10; cf. Descartes’s talk of true colors in the Third Meditation. 
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 36 For more on this, see Eco (1997). Hans Aarsleff (1964) has made much of the Adamic thought of the 
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understood him” (quoted in Hacking 1988: 144). 
 37 NE III.ii: 278. 
 38 NE III.ii: 281. 
 39  Pace Aarsleff (1964). When Leibniz says that “there is something natural in the origin of words – 
something which reveals a relationship between things and the sounds and motions of the vocal 
organs” (NE III.ii: 283), he has in mind not just onomatopoeia but the psychological concomitants 
of making certain vocalizations. For example, Leibniz thinks  r “naturally signifies a violent motion” 
(NE III.ii: 283) and hence comes to be used in words signifying such motion. 
 40 Or, more precisely, the Latin translation of this paragraph by Boethius. See Ashworth (1981, 300). 
 41 In Aristotle (1984, vol. 1: 25). 
 42 Locke,  Essay 3.1.2: 402. 
 43 The extent to which this is true depends on each philosopher’s conception of the origin of ideas. Des-
cartes’s God could in principle create a mind without one or more innate ideas; such a mind would be 
operating without a full stock of mental materials from which to form thoughts. Similarly, Locke holds 
that a person born blind will have no way of representing color, except perhaps indirectly. 
 44 Lev I.4: 19; cf. Locke,  Essay 3.1 
 45 See Ashworth (1981; 1984). On Ashworth’s reading, signification in the late Scholastic sense includes 
“aspects” of both sense and reference, though it is not to be identified with either. Ashworth argues that 
this sense of signification carries over into Locke; here we disagree. 
 46 Although this is controversial, I agree with Michael Jacovides’s claim that Locke means “resemblance” 
literally; see Jacovides (1999). 
 47 CSM I 81. Note that the motions of the brain that signify light are not themselves perceived, even 
though they make us think of light. Descartes thus rejects the traditional requirement that the sign 
itself be perceivable. Descartes might have in mind the notion of formal signs, commonly deployed by 
Scholastics such as John Poinsot, according to which a sign need not itself be perceived (see Ashworth 
1988). In this, Descartes has very few fellow travelers among the moderns; possible exceptions are the 
Cambridge Platonists, such as Ralph Cudworth. For more on this, see Slezak (2000) and Yolton (2000). 
 48 CSM I 82. 
 49  Logic I.4: 36. 
 50 This is the flip side of what is known as the disjunction problem in contemporary philosophy of mind. 
 51  Essay 3.1.2: 402. Cf. the Port-Royal  Logic : 
 On this topic we can generally say that words are distinct and articulated sounds that people 
have made into signs to indicate what takes place in the mind. Since what takes place in the 
mind consists in conceiving, judging, reasoning, and ordering, as we have already said, words 
function to indicate all these operations. 
 (II.i: 74) 
 52 Correspondingly, our intentions as hearers or readers ought to be to interpret the words as their author 
intended. For more on this, and for criticism of the indicator reading of Locke, see Winkler (2009). 
 53 This is controversial. For different views, see Ashworth (1984) and Kretzmann (1968). For a defense, 
see chapter 2 of Ott (2004) and E. J. Lowe (2007), chapter 4. 
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 54  De Corpore (henceforth “DC”) I.ii.2: 14–15. References to DC are in the following form: part.chapter.
section: page number in Hobbes (1839–45), vol.1. 
 55 DC I.ii.5: 17. 
 56 Trivially, one  could set up a convention by which ‘stone’ signifies stones, namely by uttering the sound 
only when in the presence of stone. But this is not the purpose of language, according to Hobbes (or 
Locke, or the Port-Royalians, for that matter). In such a case, words would not be able to fulfill their 
function of unfolding one’s mind to another. 
 57 See Lev I.4: 19–20: 
 So that the fi rst use of names, is to serve for  marks , or  notes of remembrance. Another is, when 
many use the same words, to signify, by their connexion and order, one to another, what they 
conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, fear, or have any passion for. And 
for this use they are called  signs . 
  Locke does not bother to distinguish between marks and signs in this way, even though he clearly thinks 
words have both uses. 
 58 If they construe the relationship between signs as causes and signs as indications as one of genus to spe-
cies, the Port-Royalians can escape my charge of having conflated the two uses. 
 59 See esp.  Essay 3.2.7–8: 407–8. 
 60  Essay 3.2.4: 406. 
 61  Essay 2.30.2: 372–3, my emphasis; see 4.11.12: 631. 
 62 For more on this, see Sally Ferguson (2001). Contemporary philosophers of mind have developed simi-
lar stories by replacing God with natural selection. These issues are very complicated; for doubts about 
reading Locke as a proponent of teleosemantics or any externalist theory of the meaning of ideas, see 
Ott (2012). 
 63 See, for example,  Essay 2.32.14: 388. 
 64 DC I.ii.6: 17. 
 65 DC I.ii.4: 16. 
 66 See Watkins (1973: 102). Watkins claims that Hobbes says nothing about the naming relation because 
he cannot accommodate it within his causal psychology. 
 67 DC I.ii.5: 17. 
 68  Essay 3.7.1: 471. 
 69 “The use then of Words, is to be sensible Marks of  Ideas ; and the  Ideas they stand for, are their proper 
and immediate Signification” ( Essay 3.2.1: 405); “[W]ords, as they are used by Men, can properly and 
immediately signify nothing but  Ideas , that are in the Mind of the Speaker” (3.2.4: 406). But Locke 
often leaves off the restriction to primary or immediate signification; for example, he writes, “[words’] 
signification [in a man’s use of them] . . . is limited to his  Ideas , and they can be Signs of nothing else” 
(3.2.8: 408). 
 70 Once again, I should note that this is controversial. For criticism of my view, see Losonsky (2007b). 
 71 Losonsky (2007b) rather puzzlingly lumps my view in with Hacking’s. Because I do not think that 
Lockean signification is sense, reference, or any combination thereof, Losonsky claims that I deny that 
Locke has a theory of meaning. This is trivially true if one means by “a theory of meaning” a  Fregean 
theory of meaning, that is one that explains the sense and reference of words. It is false if one simply 
means “a theory that purports to explain how words function in communication.” 
 72  Logic I.6: 39–40. Nuchelmans (1998a) argues that Leibniz employs a similar distinction. 
 73 By “fact-stating,” I mean something broader than the term strictly implies, to include not just declara-
tive statements but questions, conditionals, and so on. The line between fact-stating and non-fact-
stating uses is a fluid one. 
 74 See, for example,  Philosophical Commentaries , section 720; introduction to the  Principles , section 19; 
 Alciphron VII.5: 292. 
 75 See DC I.iii.1: 29. Hobbes and Descartes are thinking here of things like ‘ouch’ or perhaps profanity. 
Obviously, a word like ‘joy,’ as a sign, indicates an idea of joy, but it need not, as my own present experi-
ence attests, indicate that the person using it is experiencing joy at that moment. 
 76 Mill (1867: 15). In 1694, John Sergeant (1984: 33–5) made a similar criticism. 
 77 Thus Alston (1964) is wrong to call this sort of view “linguistic idealism.” 
 78  Essay 3.2.1: 405. 
 79 Sergeant (1984: 34). 
 80  Essay 3.11.14: 515. 
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and the anonymous pamphlet  A Dialogue Between Mr Merriman, and Dr Chymist: Concerning Sergents 
Paradoxes, in His New Method to Science, and His Solid Philosophy (London, 1698). 
 82  Essay 2.33.19: 401. 
 83  Essay 3.10.17: 499. 
 84  Essay 3.10.18: 500. Note that Locke, as elsewhere in book 3 and throughout the  Essay , does not 
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 85 See Winkler (2009). 
 86 See  Essay 3.10.17–18: 500, where Locke uses the examples of gold and malleability. 
 87 Cf. Hobbes, DC I.v.7: 60, where Hobbes argues that it is false to say that “ the definition is the essence of 
the thing .  . . . For definition is not the essence of anything but a speech signifying what we conceive of 
the essence thereof.” 
 88 For bats and birds, see  Essay 3.11.7: 511; for the baby, see 3.6.26: 452–4. 
 89 I mean, no fact of the matter beyond the contents of those ideas. Now, if our abstract ideas captured 
Aristotelian real essences, then in an indirect way the world would be settling these questions. 
 90  Essay 3.3.15: 417. 
 91 These other things include acting as migration barriers: once a thing exists with a certain essence, it 
cannot then change that essence without being destroyed. On Locke’s view, there are no such barriers 
in nature. 
 92  Essay 3.6.6: 442. 
 93  Essay 3.6.8: 443–4; 3.10.20: 501–2. 
 94 Here, I shall not delve into the details of Leibniz’s defense of the Aristotelian picture, except to the 
extent that it’s directly relevant to the question of language. For more on this debate, see Jolley (1984), 
chapter 8. 
 95 NE III.ii: 287. I depart slightly from Bennett and Remnant’s translation here. 
 96 NE III.x: 345. 
 97 This is the main point of  Essay 3.10 and, arguably, 3.6. 
 98 Against this permutation of the Aristotelian view, Locke argues that, if our ideas of substances just were 
their real essences, we would be able deduce all their other properties. See 3.10.18: 500 and 3.10.21: 
502. It is not clear how effective this is, because both Leibniz and Sergeant point out that it is no part 
of the opposing position that our grasp of these essences is complete. 
 99 Nominal definitions can be individually stipulative, as when I say that ‘mongfy’ is to mean ‘square,’ or 
collectively so, as when a convention is in place that associates a word with a given idea. What I am 
calling individually stipulative definitions cannot be challenged and are neither true nor false; ascer-
taining the truth of a collectively stipulated definition requires looking to the linguistic practices of 
one’s community. 
 100 See  Logic II.12–14: 111–123. 
 101 See, for example, Pierre-Sylvain Régis,  Refutation de l’opinion de Spinosa in Régis (1996) (first published 
1704). 
 102 See  Discourse on Metaphysics , section 24, in Leibniz (1989: 57). 
 103 This is the core of Leibniz’s objection to Descartes’s ontological argument for the existence of God. That 
argument begins with the definition of God and immediately infers His existence, from the fact that 
He is a perfect being. For Leibniz, however, one cannot simply assume that just because one knows the 
meaning of the word ‘God’ that one has in fact secured a real definition of God. One must prove that 
the constituent ideas – here, the ideas of God’s attributes – are logically consistent. Only by doing so 
can one prove that God is even a  possible being, let alone actual and necessary. See Leibniz’s letter to 
Countess Elizabeth (1989: 238f.) 
 104 Lev I.4: 23–4. 
 105 See DC VI.13. 
 106  Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect in Spinoza (2002: 26). 
 107 At least where general terms are concerned; Pettit (2008) goes much further and argues that, for Hobbes, 
language use is  constitutive of thought. That this claim is mistaken will emerge as we go. Although 
Hobbes thinks reasoning about universals requires language – because universals are names – he does 
not think that all thought (or even all reasoning) concerns universals. 
 108 Lev I.5: 30. 
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 109 Third Objections in CSM II 125. 
 110 Third Replies in CSM II 126. 
 111 “Preface to an Edition of Nizolius” (1670), in Leibniz (1969: 128). For discussion, see Watkins 
(1973). 
 112 Third Objections, CSM II 126. 
 113 Similar concerns prompt Locke’s dismantling of the Sixth Meditation argument for the intellect: the 
intellect is supposed to be immaterial, and so allowing for it would be inconsistent with Locke’s official 
agnosticism about the ultimate nature of the mind. See  Essay 2.29.13–14: 368. 
 114 See DC I.iii.7. Note that Leibniz inverts this; for Leibniz, a true proposition is one in which the (con-
cept of the) subject contains the (concept of the) predicate. See “Primary Truths” (in Leibniz 1989: 
30–4). The difference between Hobbes and Leibniz here can be accounted for, I suspect, by noticing 
that Hobbes’s definition of a true proposition is extensional, whereas Leibniz’s is intentional. That is, 
Leibniz is worried about the relations between concepts, whereas Hobbes is worried about the exten-
sions of the subject and predicate. 
 115 See esp. DC I.iii.3: 31 and DC I.ii.9: 20. 
 116 DC I.iii.2: 31. 
 117 Geach (1980: 60). 
 118 DC I.iii.2: 30. 
 119  Logic II.3: 82. 
 120 See esp.  Essay 3.7. Note that Locke does not use “judgment” to refer to the act of the mind by which 
ideas are united in a mental proposition, but rather to a propositional attitude falling short of assent but 
nevertheless with some presumption of positive epistemic status (4.18.17: 685). 
 121 This point provides indirect support for the indicator reading; the copula, if it is doing its job, cannot 
be a referring term, nor can it have Ashworthian “aspects” of both sense and reference while being 
reducible to neither. 
 122 The problem of conditionals vexed many of the most acute thinkers of the era. Leibniz wanted to reduce 
all conditional judgments to categoricals: thus, you can read “if something is a whale, it is a mammal” as 
“all whales are mammals.” This is a popular strategy in the period, also deployed by Arnold Geulincx. 
For more on this, see Nuchelmans (1998b: 123f.) But it is hard to believe that all conditionals are reduc-
ible to categorical claims. 
 123 For another statement of this argument, see Buroker’s introduction to Arnauld and Nicole (1996). 
 124  Logic II.9: 100. 
 125 I experiment with different ways to accommodate a distinction between proposition and attitude in 
Locke in chapter 2 of Ott (2004). David Owen (2007) makes a powerful argument that none of these 
will work. This issue strikes me, though perhaps no one else, as an open question. 
 126 See Hume (2000), book I, part III, section 7, paragraph 5. 
 127 By “free” here I mean that the mind is able to judge otherwise than it in fact does. 
 128 The Fourth Meditation in CSM II 40; my emphasis. 
 129  Ethics , part II, proposition 49 in Spinoza (2002: 272). 
 130 Here I mean “sense” as opposed to nonsense, not  Sinn . 
 131 Hobbes, of course, takes ideas to be images, which Descartes and the Port-Royalians deny. But this 
disagreement is orthogonal to the issue I am examining here. 
 132 CSM II 130. 
 133  Logic I.i: 27. 
 134 This is controversial. Although Locke uses “substance” in many ways, one of these is substratum, which 
I believe means the ultimate particular in which qualities inhere. I thus endorse the pin-cushion reading 
of Locke, in opposition to, for example, Michal Ayers (1991). 
 135 In Locke (1975: 745). 
 136 Cf. The Port-Royal  Logic ’s treatment of descriptions, which they treat as “less exact” definitions. See 
 Logic II.16: 126. 
 137 See Russell (1912: 46f.) 
 138  Philosophical Commentaries , section 581. 
 139 In the  Commentaries , Berkeley does eventually acknowledge that Lockean particles signify acts instead 
of ideas (section 667). This realization is no doubt an important force in the development of Berkeley’s 
doctrine of notions. But throughout his published works, he mischaracterizes Locke as holding that all 
words signify ideas. 
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